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Abstract: 
This paper documents the trends in the life-cycle profiles of net worth and housing equity 
between 1983 and 2004. The net worth of older households significantly increased during 
the housing boom of recent years. However, net worth grew by more than housing equity, 
in part because other assets also appreciated at the same time. Moreover, the younger 
elderly offset rising house prices by increasing their housing debt, and used some of the 
proceeds to invest in other assets. We also consider how much of their housing equity 
older households can actually tap, using reverse mortgages. This fraction is lower at 
younger ages, such that young retirees can consume less than half of their housing equity. 
These results imply that ‘consumable’ net worth is smaller than standard calculations of 
net worth. 
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Between 2000 and 2005, real house prices grew by about 40 percent on average and by as 
much as 100 percent in some metropolitan areas.  This rapid growth has renewed interest in 
identifying the role that housing equity plays in the net worth of retirees, and how much of their 
housing equity retirees can tap to fund non-housing consumption.  
  In this paper, we document how the evolution of house prices since 1983 has affected the 
life-cycle profile of net worth, and estimate how much of the growth of housing equity is 
actually available for non-housing consumption.  Our analysis focuses on the trends for 
households nearing retirement age and older.  In the first part of the paper, using the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), a nationally-representative survey with detailed information on asset 
and debt holdings, we find that the net worth of retirement-age households rose significantly in 
the early part of this decade, tracking trends in house prices.  However, while housing equity also 
rose, it did not grow as much as net worth.  In part, this occurred because non-housing assets 
appreciated at the same time as housing.  In addition, it appears that younger elderly increased 
their housing debt to offset some of the rise in house values and invested some of the proceeds 
from the debt in other assets.  
  In the second part of the paper, we consider how much of households’ housing equity is 
available for non-housing consumption without moving.  Many elderly are reluctant to move, 
and even if they do move they might not want to downsize.
1  However, the elderly can borrow 
                                                 
1 The baseline of no-moving (constant housing consumption) is not only conceptually attractive, it also appears to be 
realistic. Households rarely tap housing equity by moving and, when they do, it appears to be largely in response to 
particular circumstances such as an adverse health event (Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 2004); Megbolugbe et al 
(1997)).  Nor do they appear to plan on selling their houses to finance retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 
(forthcoming)).  On the other hand, other researchers have found some evidence that households do reoptimize their 
housing equity (Coronado et al (2006)), or point out that households have a valuable option to do so (Skinner 
(2007)).  Our analysis will not capture the value of the option to reduce housing consumption.  Still, even 
households that move (whether they downsize or switch to renting) will have to devote a large portion of the 
proceeds from the sale to cover the transactions costs plus future housing services.  Another way to tap housing 
equity is to simply cut back on maintenance.  [See Davidoff (2006) and Gyourko and Tracy (forthcoming).]  We 
consider that to be similar to accessing capital through credit markets in that such households cannot tap all their         2 
against their house value, essentially transferring wealth from their heirs (after death) to current 
consumption.  We use a convenient measure of the equity available to be extracted from a house: 
the amount that can be borrowed via a reverse mortgage.  In theory a reverse mortgage is an 
ideal way to consume home equity without incurring the transactions costs from moving.
2  It 
provides homeowners a lump sum loan that accrues interest and is settled against the sale of the 
house when the homeowner dies or moves out.  We consider two forms of reverse mortgages: 
first, a theoretical “upper-bound” reverse mortgage product that provides the maximum possible 
liquidity; and, second, the actual reverse mortgage products available in 2007, which appear to 
still suffer the drawbacks of having a small market. 
   We find that homeowners have considerable housing equity that they can borrow against, 
but nowhere near as much as standard measures of housing equity would imply.  The available 
loan amount generally increases with a household’s age, since the lender has less long to wait on 
average before being repaid.  Under the upper-bound reverse mortgage, the maximum fraction of 
housing equity that the median 90-year-old household could consume would be 89 percent of 
housing equity, or about $103,000. But for those aged 62 to 69, the maximum that could be 
consumed would be only 49 percent of housing equity, or about $50,500; and 11.5 percent of 
households in that age range would not have any housing equity available to consume at all.  
Under the actual (2007) reverse mortgage programs, even less of home equity is available, even 
before fees.  
  These results motivate calculating a modified measure of net worth, “consumable net 
worth,” that accounts for the fact that, absent moving, not all housing wealth is available for non-
                                                                                                                                                             
housing equity and the amount they can access will depend on the number of years they expect to remain in their 
houses.   
2 Unlike other forms of housing debt, the borrower cannot default on a reverse mortgage and he offloads to the 
lender the risk associated with the uncertainty over how long he will stay in his home.  In practice, reverse 
mortgages currently have high fees and interest rates and provide relatively little equity.         3 
housing consumption.  Even among households aged 62-69 who have consumable housing 
equity, the median consumable net worth in the upper-bound case is only three-quarters of the 
standard measure of net worth.  At age 90, the median household could consume only 91 percent 
of standard net worth. 
  This paper makes two contributions relative to previous research.  First, we provide 
updated cohort and over-time analyses of how net worth and housing equity has evolved, 
including during the recent housing boom.  This builds on Poterba and Samwick (1997) and 
Coronado et al. (2006), among others.  Poterba and Samwick (1997) use the SCF to provide a 
cohort analysis, through 1992, that includes housing wealth and housing debt. Coronado et al 
(2006) analyze home equity and net worth using two waves of the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS). We examine related issues using the SCF, which enables us to examine many more 
cohorts and much older households (up through age 94, compared to age 61 in the original HRS 
cohort).   
Second, we provide estimates of how consumable housing equity and consumable net 
worth evolve with age, cohort, and time.  Most studies add all of housing equity to net worth 
(e.g., Poterba and Samwick (1997), Mitchell and Moore (1998), Coronado et al (2006)). Others 
leave housing equity out altogether (Bernheim (2000)) or split the difference (Engen et al 
(1999)).  The closest to what we do is Venti and Wise (1991), who find that a reverse mortgage 
could increase non-housing consumption by as much as 10 percent on average, but they do not 
express that number as a fraction of housing equity or net worth.  Other research on the value of 
reverse mortgage products focuses on the potential size of the market for products, rather than 
the equity available to be tapped (Merrill et al (1994), Rasmussen et al (1995)).         4 
  It is worth emphasizing that housing is different than most other assets on household 
balance sheets because of its dual nature as both an asset and a consumption good.  Since 
households must live somewhere, they have an implicit liability for housing services that is not 
recorded in standard measures of net housing equity and net worth. (Sinai and Souleles (2005))  
Buying a home provides those housing services, but only the housing asset (net of housing debt) 
appears on the balance sheet, not the bundled liability.
3  Thus, unlike for instance a stock 
portfolio, the housing portfolio cannot be completely liquidated because there would be no 
provision for the housing service liability.  Instead a household must find another way to extract 
equity. 
  Complicating the interpretation of the results, changes in house prices do not necessarily 
lead to increases in real wealth, even if housing equity can be reallocated to non-housing 
consumption.  Because the price of housing reflects the present value of the entire stream of 
future housing services, for young households, who are most “short” housing services, increases 
in house prices can be largely offset by increases in their housing services liability, leaving their 
real wealth largely unchanged. But for older homeowners, who have a smaller remaining implicit 
housing liability, increases in house prices can translate into larger increases in real wealth, and 
thus potentially into higher non-housing consumption.
4  However, this increase in consumption 
comes at the expense of the next generation, which no longer stands to inherit the increased 
housing equity, but still inherits the commensurately higher housing liability. 
                                                 
3 Of course one can extend this line of reasoning to many other liabilities that are not measured, for instance 
households’ expected food expenses. However, in such cases there is no matching asset (or durable good) on the 
other side of the balance sheet that directly offsets the liability. Buying a house provides a hedge against changes in 
housing costs, potentially a perfect hedge for a household that never sells its house or otherwise has an infinite 
effective horizon. The example of long-term care insurance, discussed elsewhere in this volume, is related, in that it 
hedges future long-term care expenses.  
4 Consistent with this implication, Campbell and Cocco (2005) find that the response of consumption to house prices 
increases with age.         5 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: We first describe the data we use for our 
calculations, then show how net worth, housing equity, and housing debt evolve over the 
lifecycle, over time, and by birth cohort.  Then we turn to calculating the amount of housing 
equity available for non-housing consumption and the modified measure of consumable net 
worth.  Finally, we briefly conclude. 
  
Data 
The data used in our analysis was obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances.  The SCF is conducted every three years, and we use the seven cross-
sectional survey waves conducted between 1983 and 2004, excluding the 1986 Survey.  The SCF 
oversamples high-wealth families, yielding a large number of observations on holders of various 
assets and liabilities.  A more complete description of the survey can be found in Bucks et al 
(2006).  To make the estimates more representative of the overall population of the U.S., we 
apply the SCF’s replicate weights.  We exclude households where the head was under the age of 
25, age 95 or over, or born before 1900; and households whose primary residence was on a ranch 
or farm, or in a mobile home.
5  This yields almost 113,000 observations across the seven 
surveys.
6  With population weights, the data cover 71 million households in 1983 up through 97 
million in 2004.  All dollar values are inflated to 2004 dollars using the CPI research series for 
all urban consumers (CPI-U-RS).   
  In this paper, we categorize households variously by age, birth cohort, survey year, and 
remaining life expectancy.  We define the age of a household by the age of the household head, 
                                                 
5 We also drop 22 households who report negative gross assets. 
6 We have 3,506 household-level observations in 1983, 13,962 in 1989, 17,235 in 1992, 18,768 in 1995, 19,210 in 
1998, 19,854 in 2001, and 20,283 in 2004, for a total of 112,818.  The 1989 through 2004 SCFs have five replicate 
observations per household.         6 
which, by the SCF convention, is defined as the male spouse of a married couple, the older 
spouse of a same-sex couple, or the adult in a single-headed household.  The birth cohort is the 
decade in which that household head was born, such as 1910-1919 for a head aged 89 in 2004.
7  
Remaining life expectancy was obtained from actuarial tables created by the Social Security 
Administration.
8 These tables report expected remaining lifetime and the distribution of the 
probability of dying in each future year separately for men and women by age and year.  We 
merge this data to individuals in the SCF by gender, age, and year.  At the household level, in the 
case of married couples we assume the expected remaining lifetime for the household is the 
maximum of the expected remaining lifetimes over both spouses.   
 
Lifecycle analysis of housing equity and net worth 
  We begin by examining the accumulation and decumulation of assets and liabilities over 
the lifecycle, focusing on the contribution of housing equity to both phases.  Since the SCF data 
are cross-sectional, we do not actually follow the same households over time and so we have to 
make an assumption to infer what their life-cycle profiles must look like.  We can assume either 
that households of different ages observed in the same year are otherwise comparable despite 
being born in different years, or that households of different ages but from the same birth cohort 
are otherwise comparable despite being observed in different years.  We analyze the results 
under both assumptions. 
                                                 
7 Naturally, we have relatively more data on households born between 1920 and 1969 as the members of those 
households are within the age range of 25-94 for more years of the survey.  We have 1,751 observations on 
household heads born between 1900-1909; 6,735 for 1910-1919; 13,915 for 1920-1929; 16,988 for 1930-1939; 
24,496 for 1940-1949; 26,199 for 1950-1959; 17,130 for 1960-1969; and 5,604 for 1970-1979. 
8 We are grateful to Jeff Brown for sharing these tables with us.         7 
  In Figure 1, the first panel provides a cohort-based life-cycle analysis for household net 
worth.
9  A household’s age – categorized into five-year bins – is on the horizontal axis and net 
worth, in thousands of 2004 dollars, is on the vertical axis.  Each line segment corresponds to the 
median net worth for households born in a particular decade.  Most segments span multiple age 
bins because we have 21 years of surveys.  For example, someone born in 1960 will be in the 25-
29 bin as of the 1989 survey, the 30-34 bin in the 1992 survey, the 35-39 bin in the 1995 and 
1998 surveys, and the 40-44 bin in the 2001 and 2004 surveys.  The dots correspond to the 
median net worth across all households in that age bin, regardless of birth cohort.  (Cohort × age 
groups that have fewer than 11 observations are omitted from the segment drawings, but not 
from the calculations for the dots.) 
  The dots illustrate the usual age profile for net worth, with a steady accumulation 
between age 25 and 64, and generally a decumulation thereafter.  Net worth peaks at retirement 
age at around a median of $250,000 (in 2004 dollars).  There are two other notable results in this 
figure.  First, median net worth declines until age 80 (falling to just under $200,000), but then, 
for the 1900-1909 and 1910-1919 cohorts, begins to rise again.  Second, while the cohort line 
segments are tightly overlapping for households between the ages of 25 and 54, they diverge 
after that.  That is, for the most recent periods (the most recent age bins), the segments lie above 
the prior cohorts’ segment. This is especially true for the 1930-1939 and 1940-1949 birth 
cohorts. 
                                                 
9 The definition of net worth follows the one used in Bucks et al (2006).  Assets include checking, savings, and 
money-market accounts; call accounts at brokerages; certificates of deposit; directly-held mutual funds; stocks; 
bonds; retirement accounts; savings bonds; the cash value of whole life insurance; trusts, annuities, and managed 
investment accounts; other financial assets such as royalties and loans made; vehicles; primary residence, other 
residential, and non-residential real estate; business interests; and other non-financial assets such as jewelry and 
antiques.  Debt includes debt on the primary residence and other residential and non-residential real estate; credit-
card debt; installment loans not for real estate or credit cards such as vehicle or student loans; and other debts such 
as margin loans or loans against life insurance policies.         8 
  Potential explanations for these patterns can be found in the second panel of Figure 1, 
which calculates the age profile of median net worth by the year of the SCF survey. For clarity, 
only a subset of the SCF years is displayed.  The dots, being sample medians by age that are 
computed using all the SCF years, are the same across both panels.  In the second panel, the 
different SCFs’ age profiles generally peak between age 55 and 64 and, with the exception of the 
2004 SCF, decline with age or are level through age 94.  Analogous to the first panel, there is 
relatively little difference in median net worth across SCFs for households under age 55.  But for 
older households, net worth grows from 1983 to 1998, and then from 1998 through 2004.
10   
  These results are suggestive that the 2001 and 2004 increases in net worth for households 
approaching retirement age and older are responsible for the earlier patterns in the cohort 
analysis in the first panel.  That is, the upwards slant of the cohort lines is due to net worth 
growing over time for everyone, rather than age-based accumulation.  For example, the 1930-
1939 and 1940-1949 cohort lines in the top panel have the steepest increase in their last two age 
bins because they have the most concentrated exposure to 2001 and 2004 in those bins.  
Likewise, the upturn in net worth in the top panel between age 85 and 94 could be due to the run-
up in the 2000s overwhelming the usual life-cycle drawdown of net worth. 
  One key factor behind the rise in net worth between 1998 and 2004 is growth in housing 
values.  As displayed in Figure 2, during the seven years between 1998 and 2004, real national 
average house prices rose by about 25 percent, more than the growth over the 16 years between 
1983 and 1998.
11  The index graphed in Figure 2 measures house price appreciation from repeat 
                                                 
10 Gale and Pence (2006) also find that the largest gains in wealth between 1989 and 2001 accrued to older 
households.  
11 Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) show that the pattern of house price growth varies considerably across cities, 
so the national average is an imperfect proxy for the house price growth experienced by a given household in the 
SCF.  Unfortunately, city of residence is not publicly available in the SCF and even region is made available only in 
some surveys, so we cannot match external measures of house price appreciation to households in the SCF.         9 
sales of the same houses, thus controlling for changes in the quality or size of houses.  This raises 
the question: How much of the recent growth in net worth among households of retirement age 
was due to growth in housing values? 
  It appears that at least some of the growth in net worth was due to growth in housing 
values, but not all.  Both the cohort and SCF-year graphs of median home equity by age in 
Figures 3A and 3B mimic the patterns for net worth in Figures 1A and 1B, indicating that growth 
in home equity played a role.  However, while housing clearly accounts for a large portion of the 
recent increase in net worth for seniors, the dollar amounts in Figures 3A and 3B are smaller than 
for net worth (both on average and for the changes over time).  For example, while median home 
equity for 65 to 69 year olds rose from about $100,000 to $140,000 between 1998 and 2004, 
median net worth rose from about $220,000 to $320,000.  In addition, the rise in the value of 
home equity between 1983 and 2001 occurred almost exclusively for households aged 65 and 
over while the increase in net worth was spread across all ages.
12  Indeed, Figure 4 shows that 
while net worth excluding housing equity still shows a substantial increase between 1983 and 
2004, non-housing net worth grew over this time period for all ages, not just those over age 65.  
These differences suggest that housing equity growth alone cannot fully explain net worth. 
  Another way to see that net worth rose by more than housing equity is in Figure 5.  
Conditional on home-owning, the ratio of housing equity to net worth is relatively constant at 
about 40 to 60 percent over the life-cycle and over time.  (The ratio starts to increase at 
retirement, rising from 40 percent to about 70 percent for the oldest seniors, consistent with 
households drawing down their liquid assets first.)  This persistence over time can happen only 
when net worth experiences the same percentage growth as home equity which, given the higher 
initial level of net worth, implies that net worth increases more in absolute terms than housing 
                                                 
12 For brevity, subsequent graphs will focus on the over-time life-cycle profiles.          10 
equity.  In addition, the time pattern of the equity-to-net worth ratio does not match the growth of 
house prices.  In 1983, equity to net worth was unusually high and for the 1998 through 2004 
SCFs the ratio is generally lower (for any given age). 
  While growth in housing equity may not fully explain the rise in net worth, growth in 
house values may do better.  That is, if home owners increased their housing debt to offset rising 
house values and used the proceeds to invest in other assets, that could explain a pattern of net 
worth rising faster than housing equity.
13  One fact consistent with this hypothesis is that the 
growth in net worth was concentrated in the population of homeowners.  If one re-graphs Figure 
1B restricting the sample to homeowners, the results for their net worth look very similar to the 
original results for the overall population’s net worth.  By contrast, the corresponding graph for 
renters looks much different: Renters’ net worth does not rise with age and does not increase 
with house values.  (However, this data is somewhat noisy at older ages, since few elderly rent).   
Of course, one cannot automatically conclude from these last results that the rise in house 
values was solely responsible for the growth in net worth for home-owning seniors.  First, the 
population of renters is potentially very different from the population of owners. For example, 
renters are generally poorer and less likely to own assets that can significantly appreciate.  Their 
median net worth is quite low, under $10,000 for most of the life-cycle.  Second, the fraction of 
seniors that rents is small. As shown in Figure 6, by age 35 the majority of households own their 
homes. By retirement age, 80 percent of households own. The homeownership rate does not 
begin to decline much until age 80, reaching 60 percent only by age 90-94.  Thus, the vast 
majority of elderly do not consume against their home equity by selling their homes and 
becoming renters.  In general, there is no clear time pattern across SCFs in the homeownership 
                                                 
13 Coronado et al (2006) compared two cohorts in the Health and Retirement Survey, interviewed in 1992 and 2004, 
and concluded that households might have increased their housing debt in response to house appreciation in order to 
rebalance their portfolios.          11 
rate.  But, while the data are somewhat noisy, there is some indication that the homeownership 
rate among the elderly rose between 1983 and 2004, from 60-70 percent to 70-80 percent, 
depending on the household’s age.  
  While house values rose more than housing equity, suggesting that homeowners may 
have reallocated their housing equity into other assets, this appears to be less so the case for the 
elderly than for households aged 60-64 or younger.  Figure 7 reports the gross value (not 
subtracting debt) of a household’s primary residence.  The figure clearly shows the rise in house 
values in recent years, as the age profiles from more recent SCFs lie above those from earlier 
SCFs, sometimes by as much as 30 percent.  Comparing Figure 7 to Figure 3B (home equity), 
one can see that the dollar increase in house values often exceeds the increase in home equity.  In 
Figure 7, there is a steady rise over time in house values that appears at all ages and is especially 
pronounced for households aged 65 and over.  By contrast, in Figure 3B, home equity does not 
grow much between 1983 and 2001 for those under age 65.  For example, the median home 
equity rose by about $60,000 between 1983 and 2004 for households aged 60-64.  House values 
for the same age group increased by about $100,000 over that same time period.  After age 65, 
however, housing equity tracks house values more closely.  The increase in home equity between 
1983 and 2004 is much closer to the growth in house values for the 65-69 age group and, by age 
70-74, is almost exactly the same.   
  One possible explanation is that for younger households housing debt, including first and 
second mortgages as well as home equity loans and lines of credit, rose along with house values.  
For seniors this explanation is limited by the fact that few seniors have any housing debt.  In the 
top panel of Figure 8, only about 60 percent of home owning households aged 60-64 have any 
housing debt whatsoever, and this ratio steadily declines with age until it levels out at about 10         12 
percent of households aged 80 and above.  While this age profile is relatively stable over time, a 
smaller fraction of households of almost any age had housing debt in 1983 and a larger fraction 
held housing debt in 2004.  Especially for households aged 65 through 80, borrowing against the 
house appears to have become steadily more prevalent over the 1983 through 2004 time period, 
rising by as much as 20 percentage points.   
  Conditional on having any housing debt, the amount of debt rose substantially.  In Figure 
9, the pattern of the dots indicates that median debt amounts decline with age.  However, the 
households surveyed in more recent SCF years have higher debt levels at almost every age 
through 70-74.  Unlike with the frequency of having housing debt, the rise in the amount of debt 
is largely a younger-household phenomenon.  (One important caveat: since so few of the very 
elderly have debt, it is difficult to draw inferences for that age group.) 
14 
  One possible reason that the amount of housing debt rose with house values is that 
households tend to keep their leverage ratio constant.  Figure 10 reports median loan-to-house 
value (LTV) ratios by age for homeowners who have housing debt.  Indeed, except from 1983 to 
1992, the age profiles of LTV have not changed much over time.  Thus the (percent) growth in 
debt has generally kept up with the (percent) growth in house values, keeping the ratio of debt to 
value roughly constant.  This implies that, while the dollar amount of home equity rose with the 
increase in house prices, it did not rise as much in absolute terms as house values.  And given 
how few elderly have housing debt, even the apparent increases in leverage between 1992/1998 
and 2001/2004 for homeowners 75 and older have only a small effect on aggregate leverage. 
                                                 
14 The corresponding cohort analysis (not shown) suggests the possibility of a significant cohort effect, in addition to 
the time effects just discussed.  At any age, later birth cohorts have more debt than earlier cohorts.  If this reflects 
some decline in aversion to housing debt for more recent birth cohorts, then one needs to be careful about 
extrapolating from today’s seniors to future seniors.  Future cohorts of seniors could arrive in retirement with less 
housing equity than do the current elderly.               13 
  In the absence of panel data, it is difficult to directly show whether households actually 
used the proceeds from higher housing debt to invest in other assets.  Nonetheless, in the two 
panels of Figure 11 we attempt to shed some light on the matter.  Figure 11A reports the median 
value of non-housing assets, measured as total assets minus the value of the primary residence.  
Figure 11B reports the median value of non-housing assets minus housing debt, measured as 
total assets minus both the value of the primary residence and the debt on that house.  If housing 
debt is reallocated at least in part to investments in non-housing assets rather than being wholly 
spent on current consumption, we would expect the life cycle profiles in the top panel to increase 
over time more than the ones in the bottom panel.  To elaborate on the comparision: ceteris 
paribus, changes in house values without a change in housing debt should affect neither the top 
nor the bottom panels since only non-housing assets are measured.  Changes in the value of non-
housing assets should have the same effect on both the top and bottom panels.  However, an 
increase in housing debt that is used to invest in non-housing assets should raise the life-cycle 
profile in the top panel (since assets go up but housing debt is not netted out) but not in the 
bottom panel (where housing debt is netted out).  Conversely, an increase in housing debt that is 
spent would have no effect on the top panel but would lower the life-cycle profile in the bottom 
panel. 
  For younger households, below age 65, the top panel shows a rising life-cycle profile 
between 1983 and 2004.  By contrast, the bottom panel exhibits no such pattern and, in fact, the 
2004 profile lies below most of the other profiles through age 54.  This pattern suggests that 
while non-housing assets rose faster than house values for the median household in this age 
range, the difference could be explained by growth in housing debt.  For households age 65 and 
over, non-housing assets were also growing steadily between 1983 and 2004.  But unlike for         14 
younger households, there is less difference between the top and bottom panels for the 65-and-up 
households and almost no difference by age 75.  Again, that is because so few of the very elderly 
hold housing debt, so at the median there can be little reallocation from housing equity to net 
worth. 
  Lastly, we consider the fact that trends in house values might reflect not just changes in 
house prices, but also moves to different houses and other changes in the quantity or quality of 
housing.  The SCF does not report a household’s entire housing history.  But, in addition to (self-
reported) current house-value, the survey asks for the price that homeowners paid for their 
current house when they purchased it and how much they spent on remodeling and additions in 
the interim.  This allows us to roughly estimate how much of households’ housing equity is due 
to the capital gain on their current house.  Figure 12 reports median real housing capital gains 
expressed as a percentage of house equity.  We construct this variable by taking the difference 
between the self-reported house value (in 2004 dollars) and the self-reported purchase price (in 
2004 dollars), subtracting out spending on remodeling and additions, and then dividing by 
current housing equity.
15  Given the limitations of the data, the resulting measure will likely 
provide a lower-bound on the actual fraction of housing equity due to capital gains.
16  
  Even so, in 2001 and 2004 the fraction of housing equity due to capital gains rose 
substantially, to more than 30 percent of housing equity for the most senior elderly.  In earlier 
                                                 
15 For example, consider a homeowner who purchased a house for $200,000, financed 100 percent with debt.  The 
house is now worth $210,000.  This homeowner’s housing equity ($210,000 current value - $200,000 debt = 
$10,000) is entirely capital gain, and thus the household would have a ratio of 1.  If the homeowner had financed 80 
percent with debt, he would have $50,000 in housing equity ($210,000 current value - $160,000 debt) and $10,000 
in capital gain ($210,000 current value - $200,000 purchase price) and the ratio would be $10,000/$50,000 = 0.2.  
16 Unfortunately, we have a consistent CPI series only back to 1967, so households who purchased their homes prior 
to that date are omitted.  Also, we cannot adjust for the length of ownership.  E.g., consider a household who 
purchased a house in 1970 and in 2002 sold it (with a large capital gain) and purchased a new house using the gain 
as a down payment. This household would appear to have relatively small housing capital gains in 2004 because it 
would have been in the new house for only two years and we cannot track the capital appreciation from its prior 
house.         15 
years, by contrast, housing capital gains appear to have contributed relatively little to housing 
equity.  In any case, in recent years housing capital gains were clearly a large source of wealth 
for households in retirement.  
 
Consumable housing equity and net worth 
Methodology.  Given the recent increase in housing equity documented above, the rest of this 
paper considers how much of that equity the elderly can tap, both in theory and practice. We 
compute the amount of housing equity that is consumable by a household without moving, using 
two variants of a reverse mortgage. First, we calculate the theoretical upper-bound amount that a 
homeowner could borrow against his house from a risk-neutral lender. Second, as a lower bound, 
we identify how much a homeowner could borrow using the actual reverse mortgage programs in 
place in the first quarter of 2007. After computing the resulting amounts of consumable housing 
equity, we calculate the corresponding modified measures of consumable net worth, which 
includes only consumable housing equity rather than all housing equity.  
We begin by following Venti and Wise (1991) in computing the maximum fraction of a 
house’s value that could be borrowed using a reverse mortgage from a risk-neutral lender.  
Suppose a household borrows a lump-sum amount L today, lets it cumulatively compound, and 
pays off the resulting total liability at death using the proceeds from the sale of the house.  This is 
basically how current reverse mortgages work. Since the bank is risk neutral, it will set the initial 
loan amount such that in expectation the sale value of the house will exactly equal the mortgage 
balance at the time of the homeowner’s death.  In this case, the initial loan amount L is 
determined by: 
[] () ()
) ( 1 ) 1 (
a t
A
a t
a t m a t d H g L
− −
=
− + + =∑    (1)         16 
where a is the current age of the homeowner, H is the current house value, and d(t|a) is the 
probability of dying in year t conditional on being age a currently.  (In the case of married 
couples, we use the age of the youngest spouse, which determines the conditional survival 
probability as used by reverse mortgage lenders.)  The nominal mortgage interest rate is m and g 
is the nominal growth rate of house prices, for simplicity both assumed to be constant and m>g. 
In our calculations, for m we use the average nominal 30-year mortgage interest rate in the year 
the household reports having taken out the loan.  For g we will use the long-run average national 
real growth rate in house prices, 1% per year, plus the expected 10-year average annual inflation 
rate from the Livingston Survey in the year of the SCF survey.   
From L, we net out existing housing debt D to obtain our measure of consumable housing 
equity, CHE ≡ L – D.  While L must be non-negative, CHE can be negative if existing debt 
exceeds the amount of potential reverse mortgage. (In this case the household can be thought of 
as having a net housing liability, in that it will need to pay for a portion of its housing 
consumption out of income or non-housing wealth.) 
  The potential loan amount L is primarily a function of the expected remaining lifetime of 
the household. If a household is expected to live a long time, any amount it borrows has a long 
time to compound before it is settled against the proceeds of the house sale.  Thus the lender, 
who in expectation needs to have the sale value of the house equal the accumulated debt in order 
to break even, will lend a smaller initial amount to a young household, ceteris paribus.  An older 
household could borrow a greater fraction of the house value since it will repay the loan 
sooner.
17   
                                                 
17 An alternative approach is to suppose a household draws down its housing equity by selling its house and renting 
(through a long-term lease). Since the household’s housing services are no longer being provided by an owned 
house, the household will have to reserve some of the proceeds from the house sale to pay for its future rents. A 
younger household that is expected to live a relatively long time would have to reserve more of the proceeds but an         17 
Results.  The results of applying equation (1) are tabulated by age in Table 1.  The first column 
reports the fraction of households who have positive consumable housing equity. Very few 
young households have positive consumable equity (first row of the first column), and for those 
that do, the median amount of equity is small (first row of the second column).  This is because 
young households have high debt loads relative to house value and long life expectancies. By 
comparison, older households are more likely to have positive consumable home equity, and 
greater amounts of equity. Given the topic of this paper, we will focus on the households aged 62 
and older. 
  It is clear from Table 1 that older households have the potential for significant 
consumable housing equity.  For those aged 62-69, for example, among the 88.5 percent with 
positive consumable equity, the median amount is almost $50,500.  By age 90, all home owning 
households have consumable housing equity, in part because housing debt is almost nonexistent 
and also because remaining life expectancy is short.  The median amount of consumable equity 
for that age group is about $103,000. 
  While consumable home equity can be substantial in dollar terms, it can nonetheless be a 
relatively small fraction of housing equity as measured in the standard way.  For example, 
households aged 62-69 can consume only 49 percent of their standard housing equity.
18  By age 
70-79, only about two-thirds of housing equity is consumable, and even by age 90 less than 90 
percent is consumable. 
                                                                                                                                                             
older household could reserve less, ceteris paribus.  We use reverse mortgages to estimate the consumable portion 
of housing equity because, unlike rents for owner-occupied houses, mortgage interest rates are easily observable.  In 
addition, reverse mortgage lenders absorb the uncertainty over length-of-life. 
18 It turns out that in every age group in the SCF, the median household with positive consumable housing equity has 
no housing debt.  Thus it makes no difference whether we report consumable housing equity as a fraction of housing 
equity or house value.         18 
  Using consumable housing equity also makes a big difference to net worth.  The fifth 
column of Table 1 calculates consumable net worth using our measure of consumable housing 
equity rather than the standard measure of housing equity, and the sixth column compares the 
result to the standard definition of net worth.  For younger households, consumable net worth is 
only a small fraction of reported net worth, again because they have relatively larger debt and 
longer life expectancies. (One can think of their housing asset as being largely dedicated to 
paying for their large future housing liability, and so effectively unavailable for non-housing 
consumption.)  By age 62-69, less than three-quarters of the standard measure of net worth is 
consumable.  Even by age 90, only 91 percent of net worth is consumable. 
  While Table 1 provides a useful theoretical benchmark, in practice reverse mortgage 
markets do not generally allow one to borrow as much as assumed using equation (1).  First, 
legal and marketing considerations require that lenders collect the lesser of their debt position or 
the house value.  Thus, they reduce the initial loan amounts to be relatively confident that the 
house value will exceed the debt position at the time of death.  Second, problems of adverse 
selection (long-lived borrowers) and moral hazard (borrowers do not maintain their houses) also 
reduce the amount lenders are willing to lend.  Finally, current reverse mortgage markets might 
also suffer from other early-stage problems of a new financial product, such as thinness or lack 
of familiarity. 
  To bound the differences between the theoretical and current reverse mortgages, we re-
calculate consumable housing equity using the actual amount a household could borrow through 
a current reverse mortgage, using the program parameters in place in the first quarter of 2007.  
We used the on-line reverse mortgage calculator available at 
http://www.financialfreedom.com/calculator to calculate how much a borrower in zip code         19 
60614 (Cook County, Chicago) could obtain from the three primary reverse mortgage programs: 
FHA/HUD’s ‘HECM Advantage’, Fannie Mae’s ‘Homekeeper’, and Financial Freedom’s ‘Cash 
Account Advantage’.  These programs currently lend only to those aged 62 or older, so we 
computed the potential loan amount for each age between 62 and 94, and for house values in 
$25,000 increments between $0 and $1 million.  For each age × house value cell, we used the 
maximum loan amount from the three programs.  That loan amount was imputed to households 
in the SCF using the age of the youngest spouse and their self-reported house value.  When the 
SCF house value lay between the $25,000 bins, we linearly interpolated the loan amount.  From 
this potential reverse mortgage amount we netted out existing housing debt, since that is what a 
reverse mortgage lender would do. 
The amount one can borrow through the reverse mortgage market has been increasing 
steadily over time and is expected to continue to do so.  Thus we view this exercise as providing 
a lower bound on future access to home equity.  However, we did not net out fees, which are 
sizeable in the current reverse mortgage market – they can be upwards of 15 percent of the loan 
amount.  Thus, our calculations still overstate currently available consumable equity. 
  The results are reported in Table 2, which mimics Table 1 using the new computation of 
consumable housing equity.  Since households younger than 62 are not eligible for reverse 
mortgages, their consumable housing equity is no greater than zero.  Overall, the actual reverse 
mortgage programs generally provide positive consumable housing equity to fewer households 
than does the upper-bound theoretical program, especially at younger ages.  For example, only 
60 percent of 62-69 year olds have positive consumable housing equity under the actual reverse 
mortgage programs versus 88.5 percent under the theoretical upper-bound.  And for the 
households with positive equity, the actual programs generally provide a smaller amount of         20 
housing equity.  In this dimension the gap increases with age: For households age 62 and over, 
median consumable housing equity (conditional on being positive) ranges from $51,000 to 
$94,000, or about 49 percent to 76 percent of total housing equity.  The ratio of consumable net 
worth to the standard measure of net worth reflects these patterns.  It ranges from 71 percent for 
young seniors to 82 percent for the oldest seniors and is always lower than under the theoretical 
program. 
  Comparisons between Tables 1 and 2 are complicated by the fact that in Table 1 we used 
the mortgage interest and expected inflation rates at the time of the SCF survey year, but in Table 
2, by applying the 2007 reverse mortgage program, we implicitly used 2007 rates.  Table 3 
attempts to provide a better comparison by using just the 2004 SCF households for both 
computations.
19  The current reverse mortgage program is less generous than the theoretical one.  
The current program gives markedly fewer younger retirees access to consumable housing equity 
– e.g., only 51 percent of 62-69 year olds versus 90 percent in the theoretical program – and the 
amounts of equity are also smaller.    
  A natural question to ask is how the recent trends in house values affected these results. 
Consumable housing equity will generally increase with greater house values. But, as already 
noted, the recent increase in house values was partly offset by increased debt. Table 4 explores 
how this process played out, focusing on the ratio of consumable net worth to standard net worth, 
by SCF year, using the theoretical reverse mortgage program from Table 1 (which generally 
overstates consumable housing equity).  The fraction of net worth available for non-housing 
consumption is at or near all-time highs for homeowners aged 62 or older.  For those aged 62-69 
in 1989, 69 percent of net worth was consumable; by 2004, that fraction rose to 80 percent.  For 
                                                 
19 Even so, we still are comparing the 2004 SCF (with 2004 interest rates and expected inflation) to the actual 2007 
program, so the match is imperfect.         21 
80-89 year olds, the fraction of net worth that could be consumed rose from 83 percent in 1989 
to 90 percent in 2004. 
  Underlying these results, the fraction of older households with any consumable housing 
equity generally declined from the relative house price peak of 1989 to the trough of 1995-1998, 
and rose with house prices again through 2004.  However, even in 2004, the fraction had not 
caught up to its level in 1989.  This partly reflects the increased debt we observed in recent years. 
The turnaround in the amount of consumable home equity (conditional on being positive) began 
a little later, in 2001 or 2004, for households aged 62 and older. But by 2004, the median 
amounts of consumable housing equity were larger than in 1998, about double for households 
aged 62 and older. These recent trends reflect both the recent growth in house prices and the 
recent decline in interest rates.  
 
Conclusion 
  Using the SCF, we documented the evolution of the life-cycle profiles of net worth and of 
housing values, equity, and debt, from 1983 through 2004. We found that the recent increase in 
house prices increased the net worth of retirement-aged households, but less than one-for-one. In 
part, this appears to be because other assets appreciated along with housing.  In addition, 
households increased their housing debt, offsetting some of the increase in house value, and used 
some of the proceeds to invest in other assets.  However, this latter explanation seems to be most 
prevalent among younger households and to a degree among the youngest elderly, but not among 
the oldest seniors who do not hold much housing debt.   
  We also found that a large fraction of seniors’ housing equity is not actually available for 
non-housing consumption, especially for younger retirees.  For example, for the median 62- to         22 
69-year-old household, only 49% of housing equity could actually be consumed, even using the 
theoretical upper-bound reverse mortgage, and that excludes the 12 percent of such households 
with no consumable housing equity at all.  Even for the median 90-year-old household, only 89 
percent of housing equity is available.  
These results imply that consumable net worth is smaller than standard calculations of net 
worth. Even among households aged 62-69 who have consumable housing equity, median 
consumable net worth in the upper-bound case is only three-quarters of a standard measure of net 
worth.  Even at age 90, the median household could spend only 91 percent of its net worth on 
non-housing consumption. 
On the other hand, these fractions have increased in recent years, partly due to increased 
house values and lower interest rates. Overall, these results show that accounting for the trends in 
older households’ ability to extract housing equity is important for obtaining an accurate picture 
of their consumable net worth and potential standard of living. 
         23 
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Table 1: ‘Upper-Bound’ Housing Equity Available for Consumption, by Age 
 
‘Consumable’ 
housing equity 
 
 
 
Age category 
 
% > 0 
Median 
value if >0 
Median ratio 
‘consumable’ 
housing 
equity to 
house equity 
Median net 
worth using 
‘consumable’ 
housing 
equity 
Median ratio 
‘consumable’  
net worth to  
standard net 
worth 
25-61 34.7  25,690  0.26  117,991  0.59 
62-69 88.5  50,499  0.49  173,534  0.74 
70-79 95.8  66,728  0.64  160,743  0.80 
80-89 99.1  76,752  0.78  164,036  0.86 
90-94  100.0  103,093 0.89 217,212 0.91 
Median if 
age>=62  93.6 62,673 0.60  166,116  0.80 
 
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount of capital that could be extracted 
from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender (given the owners’ ages and genders and 
prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates) less the existing debt secured by the primary residence.  
Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing equity in the net worth 
calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity.  Sample includes homeowners with houses with 
values less than $1 million, 1989-2004 SCFs.         26 
Table 2: Actual Housing Equity Available for Consumption, by Age 
 
‘Consumable’ 
housing equity 
 
 
 
Age Category 
 
% > 0 
Median 
Value if >0 
Median ratio 
‘consumable’ 
housing 
equity to 
house equity 
Median net 
worth using 
‘consumable’ 
housing 
equity 
Median ratio 
‘consumable’  
net worth to  
standard net 
worth 
25-61  0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
62-69 60.0  50,981  0.49  150,423  0.71 
70-79 90.9  62,131  0.58  156,242  0.75 
80-89 97.0  68,648  0.65  154,510  0.79 
90-94 99.3  93,776  0.76  202,874  0.82 
Median if 
age>=62  80.1 60,429 0.56  154,205  0.75 
 
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the maximum amount of capital that could be 
extracted from a house by a reverse mortgage using the programs available in 2007, netting out 
the existing debt secured by the primary residence.  These programs lend only to those aged 62 
and older.  Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing equity in the net 
worth calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity.  Sample includes homeowners with houses 
with values less than $1 million, 1989-2004 SCFs. 
 
         27 
Table 3: Comparing ‘Upper-Bound’ and Actual ‘Consumable’ Housing Equity: 2004 only 
 
Best-case ‘Consumable’ 
Housing Equity 
Reverse Mortgage 
‘Consumable’ Housing Equity 
 
 
 
Age Category 
 
% > 0 
Median 
Value if >0 
 
% > 0 
Median 
Value if >0 
25-61 36.1  44,006  0.00  0 
62-69  89.5 80,110 51.2 67,768 
70-79  93.7 90,497 85.7 79,875 
80-89 100.0  119,776  94.7  102,961 
90-94 100.0  113,128  100.0  97,810 
Median if 
age>=62  93.7 93,217  75.84  81,194 
 
Notes: In columns 2 and 3, best-case ‘consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount of 
capital that could be extracted from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender in 2004 (given the 
owners’ ages and genders and prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates) less the existing debt 
secured by the primary residence.  In the last two columns, reverse mortgage ‘consumable’ 
housing equity is defined as the maximum amount of capital that could be extracted from a house 
by a reverse mortgage using the programs available in 2007, netting out the existing debt secured 
by the primary residence.  These programs lend only to those aged 62 and older.  Sample 
includes homeowners with houses with values less than $1 million, 2004 SCF. 
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Table 4: Ratio of Net Worth Available for Consumption to Standard Net Worth 
for Households with ‘Consumable’ Equity,  
Using ‘Upper Bound’ Definition, by Age and Year 
 
Year   
Age 
category  1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004  Median 
25-61  0.50 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.59 
62-69  0.69 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.80 0.74 
70-79  0.77 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.80 
80-89  0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.86 
90-94    0.90 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.91 
Median if 
age>=62  0.75 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.80 
 
Notes: ‘Consumable’ housing equity is defined as the amount of capital that could be extracted 
from a house by a risk-neutral mortgage lender (given the owners’ ages and genders and 
prevailing 30-year fixed mortgage rates) less the existing debt secured by the primary residence.  
Net worth using ‘consumable’ housing equity replaces housing equity in the net worth 
calculation with ‘consumable’ housing equity.  Sample includes homeowners with houses with 
values less than $1 million, 1989-2004 SCFs.        29 
Figure 1A: Median Net Worth by Age and Birth Cohort 
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Figure 1B: Median Net Worth by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1983-2004. Sample is limited to home owners with positive net 
worth.  We exclude age x cohort or age x SCF year cells with fewer than 11 observations.  Values are in 
thousands of 2004 dollars. 
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Figure 2: Real House Price Index: 1980:1 – 2007:1 
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Notes: Source: OFHEO Conventional Mortgage House Price Index; BLS CPI-All Urban Consumers.  The 
index is normalized so that the average over the sample period equals one.         31 
Figure 3A:  Median Home Equity by Age and Birth Cohort 
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Figure 3B:  Median Home Equity by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1. Sample is limited to home owners with positive home equity and positive net worth. 
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Figure 4: Median Net Worth – Home Equity by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1. Sample is limited to home owners with positive net worth and home equity, and 
with 0<home equity/net worth <1.         33 
Figure 5: Median Ratio of Home Equity to Total Net Worth by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1. Sample is limited to home owners with positive net worth and home equity, and 
with 0<home equity/net worth <1.          34 
Figure 6: Percent Homeowners by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1.          35 
Figure 7: Median Value of the Primary Residence by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1.  Sample is limited to home owners.         36 
Figure 8: Percent of Households with Any Housing Debt by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1.  Sample is limited to home owners.           37 
Figure 9: Total Housing Debt for Households with Any Housing Debt by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1. Sample is limited to home owners with any housing debt.         38 
Figure 10: Median Ratio of Home Secured Loans to Home Value by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1. Sample is limited to home owners with positive primary residence debt.         39 
Figure 11A: Median Value of (Assets – Primary Residence Value) by Age and SCF Year 
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Figure 11B: Median Value of (Assets – Primary Residence Value – Primary Residence Debt) 
by Age and SCF Year 
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  Source: See Figure 1.  Sample is limited to home owners.         40 
Figure 12: Median Ratio of Capital Gains and Losses on Homes to Total Home Equity 
by Age and SCF Year 
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Source: See Figure 1.  Sample is limited to home owners who acquired homes after 1966 and have 
positive home equity. 
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